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Abstract – Despite continuing research eﬀorts, knowledge of the transmission of the highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus still has considerable gaps, which complicates epidemic
control. The goal of this research was to develop a model to back-calculate the day HPAI virus is in-
troduced into a flock, based on within-flock mortality data. The back-calculation method was based
on a stochastic SEIR (susceptible (S) – latently infected (E) – infectious (I) – removed (= dead; R))
epidemic model. The latent and infectious period were assumed to be gamma distributed. Parameter
values were based on experimental H7N7 within-flock transmission data. The model was used to
estimate the day of virus introduction based on a defined within-flock mortality threshold (detec-
tion rule for determining AI). Our results indicate that approximately two weeks can elapse before
a noticeable increase in mortality is observed after a single introduction into a flock. For example,
it takes twelve (minimum 11 – maximum 15) days before AI is detected if the detection rule is fifty
dead chickens on two consecutive days in a 10 000 chicken flock (current Dutch monitoring rule
for notification). The results were robust for flock size and detection rule, but sensitive to the length
of the latent and infectious periods. Furthermore, assuming multiple introductions on one day will
result in a shorter estimated period between infection and detection. The implications of the model
outcomes for detecting and tracing outbreaks of H7N7 HPAI virus are discussed.
back-calculation / SEIR model / within-flock mortality / highly pathogenic avian influenza /
H7N7
1. INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, the highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) virus is causing societal
* Corresponding author: m.e.h.bos@vet.uu.nl
and economical damage. In recent years,
outbreaks have occurred in e.g. Hong
Kong (1997) [17], Italy (1997, 1999) [4, 5],
Canada (2004) [3] and regular outbreaks
have occurred in Southeast Asia since
Article available at http://www.edpsciences.org/vetres or http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/vetres:2007008
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2003 [18]. In 2003, HPAI virus sub-
type H7N7 caused an epidemic in The
Netherlands [10, 20]. Within two months
255 flocks were diagnosed as infected, and
by the end of the epidemic around 30 mil-
lion animals had been killed and destroyed,
either pre-emptively or because they were
from infected farms.
An important control measure during
epidemics is forward tracing of the con-
tacts of an infected farm in order to respond
quickly to secondary infections [9]. For op-
timized tracing, knowing when a virus has
been introduced into the infected flock or
herd is essential, since it enables focusing
on contacts between the time of virus in-
troduction and culling.
However, this requires both identifying
the contact that infected the flock (back-
ward tracing), which is often unknown, and
how HPAI is transmitted in a real poul-
try flock. To our knowledge, within-flock
transmission has only been studied under
experimental conditions, resulting in an
indication of bird-to-bird transmission pa-
rameter values for the HPAI virus strain
used in these experiments1 [21, 22]. How-
ever, there is a considerable gap between
transmission experiments with a few an-
imals and the field conditions of farms
containing tens of thousands of animals.
In this paper, modeling was used to
extrapolate the results from transmission
experiments to field situations. The model
shown in this paper constitutes the basis
for a back-calculation method to estimate
the day of virus introduction into a poultry
flock based on within-flock mortality data,
which is information easily obtained from
poultry keepers. The model was applied on
1 Van Boven M., Van der Goot J.A., Katsma
E., Koch G., De Jong M.C.M., Transmissie van
hoogpathogeen aviair influenzavirus in gevac-
cineerde en ongevaccineerde goudfazanten en
roodschoudertalingen, Animal Sciences Group,
Wageningen University and Research Centre,
2005.
Figure 1. Graphical representation of the stages
and classes in the model.
within-flock mortality data collected on in-
fected farms during the Dutch AI H7N7
epidemic in 2003, and the implications are
discussed.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Model
We programmed a stochastic SEIR type
epidemic simulation model, in which birds
were either susceptible (S), infected but
not yet infectious (= latently infectious)
(E), infected and infectious (I) or removed
(dead) (R) as the basis for the analyses.
The latent and infectious periods were as-
sumed to be gamma distributed with an
integer-valued shape parameter to enable
eﬃcient simulations, using the “method of
stages” [6, 12, 13]. In our model, suscep-
tible birds that are infected have to pass
through nE latent stages before becoming
infectious (see Fig. 1 for a graphical rep-
resentation of the stages and classes in the
model). The per capita rate at which a bird
leaves each latent stage is given by nEγ
(with γ denoting the rate at which a la-
tent bird becomes infectious), so that the
amount of time spent in the latent period is





. After the last latent stage, birds
go through nI infectious stages before dy-
ing, with per capita rate nIµ per infectious
stage (with µ denoting the rate at which an
infectious bird dies). This implies that the
total amount of time spent in the infectious
period is gamma distributed with mean 1µ
and variance 1
nIµ2
. As the number of stages
increases, the distributions of the latent and
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Figure 2. Probability density plot for the
gamma distribution of the length of the latent
(solid line) and infectious (dashed line) peri-
ods in the SEIR model of H7N7 within-flock
transmission, in agreement with the transmis-
sion experiments [22].
infectious periods become more and more
concentrated around the mean values.
Available data from H7N7 experiments
with chickens [22] indicate that the latent
period is between one and two days, and
the infectious period is 6.3 days (95% con-
fidence interval (CI): 3.9−8.7). Therefore,
γ was taken to be 0.5 (day−1) (i.e. the mean
latent period was two days) and µ was
taken to be 0.159 (day−1) (i.e. the mean
infectious period was 6.3 days) in agree-
ment with the experiments [22]. The shape
parameters (nE and nI) were set at 20 so
that the distributions of the latent and in-
fectious periods correspond to the variation
observed between chickens in the exper-
iments. See Figure 2 for the probability
density plots for the length of the latent and
infectious periods for the default model.
The model is fully specified by five pa-
rameters: the mean length and variance
of the latent period, the mean length and
variance of the infectious period and the
transmission rate parameter β (dimension:
day−1). The transmission parameter is a
measure for the number of susceptible
birds infected by one infectious bird per
day. Corresponding with the transmission
experiments, we set β 33 day−1 [22]. In
our formulation the transmission term was
βS(t)I(t)/N(0), with S(t) and I(t) denoting
the number of susceptible and infectious
birds in the population at time t, respec-
tively, and N(0) denotes the total number
of birds present in the population at the
start of the outbreak. This formulation im-
plies that we scale the transmission term
with population size for the extrapolation
between chicken populations of diﬀerent
sizes. The reason for this is that although
chicken populations are of diﬀerent sizes,
e.g. 10 in the transmission experiments
and 10 000 on a farm, the density is simi-
lar since the area on which the chickens are
kept is much larger in the latter case [2, 8].
Thus, in this model the transmission rate
parameter is scaled for the initial popula-
tion size. However, in the model we do not
let the transmission depend on the decreas-
ing population size due to mortality during
the outbreak, because the decreasing pop-
ulation size will then result in a decreasing
density since the area on which the chick-
ens are housed is not decreased [1].
To simulate the outbreaks we used the
following discrete time step approach. At
any given time (t) the population is charac-
terized by a vector (S (t), E1(t), E2(t), . . . ,
E20(t), I1(t), I2(t), . . . , I20(t), R(t)) describ-
ing the number of birds in each separate
stage within a class. We denote the num-
ber of transitions from the susceptible to
the first latent stage by C(S→E1 ); other tran-
sitions are similarly denoted. Given the
number of susceptible birds in S at time
t (S(t)), the number of birds that is in-
fected in a short time span of length ∆t is
given by:
C(S→E1 ) ∼2Bin(S (t), 1−
exp(−βI(t)/N(0)∆t)) (1a)
Thus, the number of transitions from S to
E1 is binomially distributed with parameter
1 − exp(−βI(t)/N(0)∆t) (the probability of
transition of a single bird) and binomial to-
tals S (t). Other transitions are treated in a
2 This mathematical symbol (∼) means “has dis-
tribution”.
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similar manner according to the transition
rules in (1b−1e).
C(Ex→Ex+11 ) ∼ Bin(Ex(t), 1
− exp(−γnE∆t)) (for 1 ≤ x ≤ nE − 1)
(1b)
C(EnE→I1) ∼ Bin(EnE(t), 1
− exp(−γnE∆t)) (1c)
C(Iy→Iy+11) ∼ Bin(Iy(t), 1
− exp(−µnI∆t)) (for 1 ≤ y ≤ nI − 1)
(1d)
C(InI→R) ∼ Bin(InI (t), 1
− exp(−µnI∆t)) (1e)
2.2. Simulation details
The model simulated within-flock out-
breaks, following the transition rules speci-
fied in (1). For our default parameter values
simulations were started with one latently
infected bird in a population of suscepti-
bles totalling 10 000 birds. The time-step
was set at 0.01 day (i.e. less than 15 min).
The output of interest was the number of
birds that died per day (R); in which one
day was defined as lasting from x.01 day
to (x + 1).00 day. For each parameter
value combination a thousand iterations
of the model were run, which took about
150 min. The model was implemented with
MATHEMATICA 5.2.
For each iteration of the model, the
number of days it took to reach a defined
threshold value of dead birds per day (de-
tection rule for determining AI) was listed.
The default detection rule was formed by
the current Dutch legislation that obliges
poultry farmers to notify authorities when
mortality among their layers is 0.5% of the
flock or more on each of two consecutive
days. Subsequently, the outcomes gave es-
timates for the time since infection, based
on the mode, minimum and maximum of
the number of days between infection and
detection. Next, the most likely day the
virus was introduced into the flock could
be back-calculated.
2.3. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analyses were performed for
flock size, mean length of latent and in-
fectious period and number of virus in-
troductions, by running the model with
diﬀerent values for these parameters. For
flock size, values were chosen based on
the range of farms in the total field data
set; 1 000 and 40 000 birds. The mean
length of the latent period was set at 1.5
and 2.5 days; the latent period does not
seem very variable according to the results
from transmission experiments [21, 22].
The basic reproduction ratio, R0, is an ex-
pression for the average number of new
cases arising from one infectious chicken
in a totally susceptible population [15]. In
our model R0 is given by the product of
the transmission rate parameter β and the
average infectious period. To maintain in-
ternal consistency, R0 was kept at the same
value, the point estimate resulting from
the experiments [22], while varying β and
the mean length of the infectious period.
The 95% confidence interval limits for the
mean infectious period from the transmis-
sion experiments were used for the sensi-
tivity analysis: 3.9 days (β = 53.3/day) and
8.7 days (β = 23.9/day) [22]. The number
of virus introductions was set at 10 and 100
at time t = 0.
The outcomes of the default model were
also analysed with diﬀerent detection rules
to see how these detection rules influence
the detection period: absolute number of
dead animals on one day, mean number of
dead animals on two consecutive days and
cumulative number of dead animals on two
consecutive days followed by an absolute
number of dead animals on the third day.
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These detection rules aim at a faster start
of the increase in mortality, a gradual in-
crease or a recurrent increase.
2.4. Application of model
The outcomes of the model were ap-
plied on within-flock mortality data from
loose-housed layer flocks in the field
dataset, which contains data collected from
241 infected and depopulated farms dur-
ing the Dutch AI epidemic in 2003. There
were 92 loose-housed layer flocks with at
least two consecutive daily mortality data
points. The flock size ranged from 480 to
37 375 chickens, with a median of 6 719.
We applied the current Dutch moni-
toring threshold for notification, which is
at least 0.5% within-flock mortality on
each of two consecutive days for layer
flocks [14], on these loose-housed layer
flocks to illustrate the use of the model.
At the time of the epidemic, this notifica-
tion threshold was not in use. The results
will be presented according to the back-




The default model output is the num-
ber of susceptible (S), latently infected (E),
infectious (I) and dead (R) chickens per
day after a single virus introduction into
a 10 000 chicken flock (Fig. 3). Note that
the main diﬀerence between the iterations
was the time of epidemic onset, depicted
in the E plot in Figure 3. A noticeable rise
(> 0.5%) in the number of dead chickens
was visible from day ten on (R plot in
Fig. 3), and most of the susceptible chick-
ens became infected after nine to twelve
days (> 95%; I plot in Fig. 3). The sharp
peak in E compared to I was in agree-
ment with the small variation in the latency
Figure 3. Examples of the model output for
flocks of 10 000 chickens; five iterations.
Shown is the number present per day of sus-
ceptible chickens (S), the number of latently
infected chickens (E), the number of infectious
chickens (I) and the number of dead chickens
(R) after the introduction of one H7N7 infected
chicken into the flock at day one.
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Table I. Estimated day (mode (minimum–maximum)) of single introduction of the H7N7 AI virus
into a layer flock in terms of the number of days before detection, according to various mortality
threshold values (X; number of dead birds) and flock sizes. The first column gives the number of
chickens present in the flock, the second column gives the threshold number and percentage for
detection, and the third, fourth, fifth and sixth column give the diﬀerent detection rules for which
the second column forms the basis.
Flock size Mortality threshold X Dead X Dead on each X Mean dead X Cumulative dead
X % per day of 2 consecutive on 2 days on 2 consecutive days
days + X dead on 3rd day
10 000 1 0.01 9 (5–11) 10 (7–12) 9 (7–11) 10 (7–12)
10 000 5 0.05 10 (8–12) 11 (9–13) 10 (9–12) 11 (9–13)
10 000 15 0.15 11 (9–12) 12 (10–13) 11 (9–13) 11 (10–13)
10 000 50 0.5 11 (10–14) 12 (11–15)a 12 (10–14) 12 (11–14)
10 000 500 5 13 (12–15) 14 (13–16) 13 (12–15) 14 (13–16)
100 15 15 11 (10–13) 12 (11–15) 12 (10–14) 12 (10–14)
4 000 15 0.38 11 (9–13) 12 (10–14) 11 (9–13) 11 (10–13)
40 000 15 0.04 11 (9–12) 12 (10–13) 11 (10–13) 11 (10–13)
a Default model outcome: current Dutch monitoring rule for notification ( 0.5% on each of two consec-
utive days).
period in comparison with the infectious
period.
The estimated day of single introduc-
tion of the virus into a flock according to
the model is shown in Table I. For the de-
fault model with the default detection rule
(50 dead animals or more on each of two
consecutive days) we found that the virus
was introduced most likely 12 (11−15)
days before detection.
3.2. Sensitivity analysis
The results for the sensitivity analyses
are given in Tables I and II.
Decreasing the latent period with half
a day decreases the detection period with
one day, whereas increasing the latent pe-
riod with half a day leads to a two day
longer detection period. Note that a longer
latent period leads to a wider minimum to
maximum range. Decreasing or increasing
the infectious period seems to shift the de-
tection period as a whole: the range stays
four days. Increasing the number of virus
introductions on a single day (at time t = 0)
reduces the detection period, and seems to
reduce the range of time since the virus
might have been introduced. Flock size
has little influence on the estimated day of
virus introduction. When the current Dutch
monitoring rule is applied to a flock of a
thousand chickens or of 40 000 chickens
the most likely day of introduction only
changes one day from the default model
outcome. In Table I it can be seen that
changing the detection rule also has little
eﬀect on the detection period.
3.3. Application of model
After applying the results of the default
model on our field dataset according to the
current Dutch notification legislation, we
found that out of the 92 loose-housed layer
flocks 71 did not reach the threshold value.
During the later part of the epidemic, the
notification threshold was rarely reached
before depopulation.
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Table II. Sensitivity analysis on the estimated day (mode (minimum–maximum)) of introduction
of the H7N7 AI virus into a flock in terms of the number of days before detection, according to the
monitoring threshold value in the Netherlands (i.e. ≥ 0.5% mortality on each of two consecutive
days). The first column gives the model adaptation, the following columns give the length of the
latent and infectious period, number of virus introductions and flock size, and the last column gives
the estimated day since virus introduction: the mode is given in dark grey and the range is given in
light grey. × and – denote the mode and range of the default model, respectively.
a To maintain the same value for R0 the β for this simulation is set at 53.3 and for b β is set at 23.9
(default value: 33).
In the 21 flocks that did reach the mor-
tality threshold, four flocks were depopu-
lated on the day the monitoring rule the-
oretically would have caused notification
(see Tab. III). The other seventeen flocks
were depopulated between one and nine
days after theoretical notification. These
latter flocks were among the first flocks de-
tected during the epidemic. Table III shows
that the flocks that were depopulated af-
ter the threshold would have been reached
were longer infections than in our simula-
tion output.
See Figure 4 for the comparison of
within-flock mortality data of a farm that
did reach the monitoring threshold before
depopulation (Farm A) and a farm that did
not reach this threshold (Farm B) with re-
sults of the model (R).
4. DISCUSSION
In this paper a new tool was devel-
oped for back-calculating the day of H7N7
HPAI virus introduction into a flock based
on H7N7 related mortality data of this
flock. The within-flock mortality was eas-
ily obtainable, since poultry keepers rou-
tinely record this. Therefore, the model can
provide a quick overview of when the flock
was most likely infectious to other flocks
and during which period tracing should
take place.
The model was robust for flock size and
detection rule: there was little variation in
the outcomes for diﬀerent flock sizes or
detection rules (see Tab. I). This is likely
due to the relatively large susceptible flock
size, as compared to one infectious bird.
Another reason will be the fact that we
measured directly at the beginning of the
outbreak, when the number of dead birds
was increasing exponentially because of
the large number of susceptible birds. The
model shows only slightly diﬀerent vari-
ation when the length of the latent and
infectious periods were changed, or when
multiple introductions were modeled (see
Tab. II). It is important that the values for
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Table III. Application of the 10 000 flock size model results on field data. Theoretical notification
was calculated according to the current Dutch legislation for notification (≥ 50 dead animals on each
of two consecutive days). The first column gives information characterizing the number of loose-
housed layer flocks mentioned in the second column. The third column gives the back-calculated
length of the period between virus introduction and depopulation, given in (mode (minimum–
maximum)) days.
Flocks in field dataset # Flocks Back-calculated period between
(n = 92) virus introduction and depopulation
(mode (minimum–maximum) days)
Depopulated before threshold for theoretical notification 71
Depopulated within 0 days after theoretical notificationa 4 12 (11–15)
Depopulated within 1 days after theoretical notification 9 13 (12–16)
Depopulated within 2 days after theoretical notification 5 14 (13–17)
Depopulated within 6 days after theoretical notification 1 17 (16–20) (Fourth detected case)
Depopulated within 8 days after theoretical notification 1 20 (19–23) (First detected case)
Depopulated within 9 days after theoretical notification 1 21 (20–24) (Second detected case)
aDefault model outcome.
these parameters be well defined, prefer-
ably with high precision, which will never
be the case in small-scale transmission ex-
periments.
The results also show that, according to
the model, roughly all chickens in a flock
are infectious before the number of dead
chickens begins to noticeably increase.
This means that by the time a poultry
keeper notices an unusually high number
of dead chickens, the H7N7 virus could al-
ready have been spreading between flocks
for almost two weeks. This was also
found by Stegeman et al. (2004) [20] who
determined the infectious period to be
13.8 (95% CI: 9.9−17.6) days for flocks
suspected of infection with AI on the first
day of detection of the H7N7 epidemic
in the Netherlands in 2003. After the epi-
demic was detected, the infectious period
was shown to decrease to 7.3 (95% CI:
3.4−11.1) days, due to control measures.
The results of the model show that infec-
tious chickens can be present in the flock
from day one until day 26, indicating that
this is the period during which a flock can
be infectious to other flocks.
Two previous models for determin-
ing the day of virus introduction into a
herd were designed by Stegeman et al.
(2004) [19] and Laevens et al. (1998) [11].
These models for Classical Swine Fever
virus introduction into a herd of pigs, were
based on serological results of either a
sample of (13−54% [19]) or all pigs in a
herd [11]. They relied upon knowing the
exact day of introduction for some herds,
based on the contact that caused the infec-
tion. In our case, neither the contact nor the
exact day of introduction was known, nor
was extensive virus isolation performed
to estimate within-flock prevalence. How-
ever, high within-flock mortality can be
a good indication of HPAI infection of
a flock, and these data were retrospec-
tively collected after diagnosis of the flock.
Therefore, during an HPAI epidemic, all
poultry farmers should be asked to main-
tain daily mortality records, at least for the
duration of the epidemic.
A careful examination of assumptions
underlying a model is always neces-
sary [7]. The model uses a discrete time
step approach to simulate a continuous
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Figure 4. R output of the model (five iterations
shown) in detail (R) compared to field data:
within-flock mortality of a farm which reached
the current monitoring threshold before depop-
ulation (Farm A) and a farm which did not
reach the threshold before depopulation (Farm
B). The dots represent the day the theoretical
monitoring threshold would have been reached
and day zero represents the day of depopulation.
For R the x-axis shows the number of days since
virus introduction (= day one). In all graphs the
y-axis represents the number of dead animals.
process. Internal validation showed that the
model yields the same results as a contin-
uous approach would have (results are not
shown).
The decision to include a latent period
in the model was based on the transmis-
sion experiments. In the transmission ex-
periments with H7N7, a latent period of
two days was used [22]. This latent period
was based on previous transmission exper-
iments, in which a model based on a latent
period of one to two days fit the data better
than a latent period of one day [21]. Also,
we decided that we could not ignore a la-
tent period which is a third of the infectious
period.
Our model used parameter values de-
rived from two transmission experiments,
each with five infectious and five sus-
ceptible chickens [22]. This number is
common for transmission experiments, but
we do not know how these results relate
to field conditions where tens of thou-
sands of chickens are housed together.
We decided to use these parameter val-
ues nonetheless, because values from field
conditions are still unknown, and the trans-
mission experiment results were reason-
ably defined for the length of the latent
and infectious period. Moreover, one of
the goals of our model was to extrapolate
results from transmission experiments to
field conditions.
Another assumption made in this model
is that all R chickens were dead. However,
in the transmission experiments 3 out of
10 susceptible chickens survived a H7N7
contact infection [22], meaning that some
R chickens in the experiments recovered.
Given that the dead chickens counted in
field data may only form a part of the
R chickens in the model, the model may
overestimate the number of dead chickens.
This may lead to an underestimation of the
time since introduction. In addition, the an-
imals that died in the experiments had a
shorter infectious period than did the sur-
viving animals, indicating the need for two
diﬀerent I populations. However, because
of scarcity of data, we chose to model all
I chickens similarly.
In contrast to the default model with
one latently infected chicken at the start
of the outbreak, multiple introductions lead
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to a quicker increase in the number of
dead chickens. Therefore, multiple intro-
ductions lead to a shorter period between
infection and detection, although, accord-
ing to the model, the diﬀerence is only
between one and three days. Since it is sel-
dom known for AI outbreaks how many
introductions have taken place, and the dif-
ference is small, we think it better to opt for
being on the safe side and use one intro-
duction in the model. This caution is espe-
cially appropriate given that the main use
for this model is to support control mea-
sures, by defining the period for tracing.
The model excluded non-AI related
mortality, since no reliable normal daily
mortality default values could be obtained.
However, in the light of the chosen mor-
tality thresholds, only during an outbreak
of some other pathogen the Dutch moni-
toring rule would be triggered. Such ‘false
positives’ (i.e. false AI detections) are not
considered a problem during an H7N7 epi-
demic, but might cause a problem when
the H7N7 virus is not present in the coun-
try. This is a common specificity problem
of any detection rule based on ‘syndrome
monitoring’.
When used for control purposes, it has
to be kept in mind that this model is
based on assumptions from transmission
experiments. We do not recommend that
tracing only needs to focus on the period
before notification as estimated from this
model. The current Dutch regulations are
that backward-tracing should be done for
at least three weeks prior to the diagnosis
of AI in the flock; and this period might be
extended depending on the assumed mo-
ment of infection based on mortality and
symptoms3. This seems long but safe com-
pared to our model results, which give a
period of 12 (11−15) days between H7N7
3 VWA, Traceren, Algemene informatie, in: Dr-
aaiboek AI [on line] (2001) http://www.rvv.agro.
nl/mavim/draaiboeken/AI_2001/default.htm
[consulted 7 July 2006].
virus introduction and suspicion accord-
ing to the monitoring threshold, as seen in
Table I. If resources are scarce, as is com-
monly the case in the early epidemic phase,
two weeks of tracing would cover the high-
est risk period for loose housed laying hen
flocks and save resources.
After applying the current Dutch legis-
lation for notification to the field dataset, it
was shown that the majority of the flocks in
this dataset never reached this within-flock
mortality threshold. This indicates that af-
ter the first two weeks of the epidemic,
flocks were detected before their within-
flock mortality theoretically would have
caused notification. This may be because
poultry keepers were paying more atten-
tion to the health of their flocks because
of the ongoing epidemic, and therefore al-
ready notified authorities when they had
a little excess mortality, thus creating a
test system with high sensitivity. Accord-
ing to our model results, the flocks that did
reach the mortality threshold might have
been spreading the virus to other flocks
for 11−24 days before they were depop-
ulated (see Tab. III). If the current Dutch
monitoring threshold had been in place, the
first outbreaks would have been detected
earlier.
In conclusion, this type of model can
be a useful tool to back-calculate the day
of HPAI H7N7 virus introduction and thus
support control measures, but needs to be
based on sound data on pathogen trans-
mission. Although it was developed using
H7N7 HPAI virus as an example, the tool
can also be modified for other viruses that
follow a similar SEIR pattern and result
in high mortality with the possibility to
record all mortality from the whole flock
or herd. The population should follow ho-
mogeneous mixing patterns, therefore the
model might not be useful for e.g. caged
animals. We assume that in battery caged
flocks the transmission of H7N7 HPAI will
be slower than in loose housed flocks be-
cause of spatial separation of the cages.
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Savill et al. (2006) [16] indeed found a
within-flock R0 ≈ 66 for unvaccinated
floor-reared birds and R0 ≈ 25 for caged
systems with 8 birds per cage for their
HPAI H5N1 model.
To use this model, it is important to col-
lect daily mortality data and maintain these
records at least for the duration of the epi-
demic.
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